Political ideology represents an area of particular contention in the context of individual differences in analytic thinking, both theoretically and empirically. As a strong contrast to the perspective offered above, Kahan (2013) has argued that the primary role of analytic thinking is not to inform beliefs, behaviors, ideologies, but rather to reinforce them (see also : Haidt, 2012; Haidt, 2001) . That is, individuals typically reason more like lawyers (who use reasoning to convince others -and themselves -that they are correct) than philosophers (who use reason to get closer to the truth). Under this account, one should not expect analytic thinking to have a directional effect on political ideology such that one group is more analytic than the other.
Rather, analytic thinking is used to engage in motivated reasoning and to protect one's identity when challenged, such that more analytic individuals are expected to be more polarized (Kahan et al., 2012; Kahan, Peters, Dawson, & Slovic, 2017) .
There are, in contrast, a suite of theories that do predict ideological differences in analytic thinking. Talhelm et al. (2015) , for example, argue that liberals should be more analytic because they come from a more individualistic culture that is less focused on social bonds (which are facilitated by intuitive or holistic thinking). Jost (2017) argues that conservatism emerges from a need to manage threat and, in support of this contention, provides evidence from a series of meta-analyses that find liberals are more tolerant of uncertainty, less dogmatic, less cognitively rigid, have less need for order, and (more generally) are more disposed toward reflective thought (see also, Hibbing, Smith, & Alford, 2014; Jost et al., 2003) . Finally, Eidelman et al. (2012) argue that the conservative emphasis on personal responsibility, acceptance of hierarchy, and preference for the status quo is facilitated by reliance on intuition instead of reason. Support for these theories would be undermined by a lack of correlation between political ideology and CRT performance. This is particularly the case given that the CRT is a behavioral measure of analytic CRT & Conservatism 7 thinking and is therefore more externally valid than the self-report measures that are typically used in this research (for example, individuals who are intuitive often claim that they are analytic; (G. Pennycook, Ross, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2017) The empirical evidence for a negative association between analytic thinking and conservative political ideology is just as contentious as the theories surrounding the association.
Indeed, the first study that reported a small negative correlation (r = -.16) between conservative political ideology and CRT performance (among Americans) failed to replicate this finding in a second study using a more international sample (Pennycook et al., 2012) . Subsequently, Iyer, Koleva, Graham, Ditto, & Haidt (2012) found, based on a single self-identification item, that liberals scored higher on the CRT than conservatives (but that Libertarians scored the highest) in a large sample of American individuals (N = 9721) who signed up to participate in a psychology study on YourMorals.org. However, Kahan (2013) found that Republicans actually scored higher than Democrats using a large (N = 1,750) representative panel of Americans from YouGov, but did not find a significant correlation with overall conservatism (using a likert scale). Piazza and Sousa (2013) also failed to find a significant correlation between cognitive reflection and conservative political ideology. Moreover, a recent meta-analysis found that conservatives and liberals were just as prone to partisan bias in motivated reasoning experiments (Ditto et al., 2018) .
More recent studies suggest that the distinction between social and economic political ideology is crucial: Whereas social conservatism is defined by opposition toward issues that pertain to social change (e.g., abortion, gay marriage, etc.), economic conservatism pertains to support for the free market and capitalism. More recent studies found that analytic thinking often correlates with social but not economic conservatism (Deppe et al., 2015; Pennycook et al., CRT & Conservatism 8 2014; Saribay & Yilmaz, 2017 ; but see Sterling, Jost, & Pennycook, 2016) , including in a Turkish sample (Yilmaz & Saribay, 2016) . Moreover, reliance on intuition is particularly strongly associated with conservative moral values (Deppe et al., 2015; Pennycook et al., 2014; Yilmaz & Saribay, 2017a) , which pertain to social conservative issues.
Current study
As summarized above, there is a great deal of contention surrounding the common claim that conservatives are more intuitive and less analytic than liberals in the United States.
Moreover, the overwhelming majority of past work has focused on political ideology and attitudes, whereas to our knowledge only one study (Kahan, 2013) reported differences based on party affiliation (showing the opposite result as would be expected, with Republicans relying less on intuition than Democrats). Even more importantly, no previous work has investigated the potential role of analytic thinking in political behavior. To this end, we report a large aggregate analysis of 15,001 participants from 19 studies completed since the 2016 US Presidential Election (specifically, between December 2016 and November 2017; all on Mechanical Turk).
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Along with the CRT, participants in every study completed a suite of political measures, including party affiliation, political ideology, and an identification of who they voted for (or if they voted) in the 2016 election. This large sample allowed us not only to compare liberals and conservatives on various measures, but to investigate the interaction between political party affiliation and political behavior.
Method

Participants
Across the 19 studies, we only retained participants for which CRT and voting behavior data was available. This left us with 16,650 participants. However, there were 1,619 participants who completed more than one study 3 (based on their MTurk ID) and we only retained the first instance. A further 30 participants were removed because they did not enter a valid MTurk ID.
The final sample therefore consisted of 15,001 participants (56.3% female; Mage = 35.3, SDage = 11.3).
Materials
There were a variety of measures included across the 19 studies; here we focus solely on the measures of interest (and which were present in all 19 studies). The original purpose of each study was to investigate various factors relating to fake and real news (Pennycook, Cannon, & Rand, 2018; Pennycook & Rand, 2017a ) -as a consequence, participants always read and rated the accuracy of (and/or willingness to share) news article headlines (which varied from study to study) prior to completing the measures of present interest. Measures were administered via Qualtrics survey software, and in the order that they are outlined here.
Cognitive Reflection Test. We used a 7-item Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT): The original 3-item CRT (Frederick, 2005) , but reworded slightly (the mathematical structure was maintained; Shenhav et al., 2012; Shenhav, Rand, & Greene, 2017 ) and a less math-focused version from Thomson and Oppenheimer (2016) . The CRT has been shown to predict a number of factors even after taking numeracy (Pennycook, Fugelsang, et al., 2015; or cognitive ability (Shenhav et al., 2012; Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2014; Toplak et al., 2011) into account, although performance reflects both cognitive ability and cognitive style (i.e., "analytic thinking", broadly). Recent research indicates that prior exposure to the CRT does not undermine its predictive validity (Bialek & Pennycook, 2017) . The two versions were strongly correlated, r(14999) = .50, and the full 7-item CRT had acceptable reliability, Cronbach's α = .75. The results were highly similar when analyzing the two versions of the CRT separately. We scored the CRT based on the number of correct answers as opposed to the number of incorrect intuitive answers (Pennycook, Cheyne, et al., 2016) , but the results were highly similar regardless of the scoring strategy. Household income data (before taxes) was curated from two sources with different response options, so we combined the questions into four categories: Less than $10,000, $10,001-$50,000, $50,001-$100,000, and greater than $100,000. For analyses purposes, dummy variables for the first three income levels were used.
Results
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A demographic breakdown for the full range of voting responses can be found in Table 1 .
Means and standard deviations can be found in the appendix. Data are available at the following link: https://osf.io/kshu7/. (Gignac & Szodorai, 2016) . Interaction between behavior and affiliation. As evident from categories (among Democrats) in a regression with age, gender, and education as controls also produced a significant difference, r = -.10, β = -.10, p < .001 (and with ethnicity and income as additional controls in the smaller sample, r = -.08, β = -.08, p < .001).
Among Republicans, the pattern was much different. A Tukey's HSD test revealed that
Republicans who voted for a 3 rd -party candidate scored higher on the CRT than any other group.
There were no differences between Clinton voters, Trump voters, and non-voters. Comparing 3 rd -party voters with all other voter categories (among Republicans) in a regression with age, gender, and education as controls also produced a significant difference, r = .10, β = .10, p < .001
(and with ethnicity and income as additional controls in the smaller sample, r = .12, β = .11, p < .001).
Finally, among Independents, there were two homogeneous subsets: 1) Non-voters and Trump voters, who had lower scores, and 2) Clinton and 3 rd -party voters, who had higher scores.
Comparing Trump and non-voters with Clinton and 3 rd -party voters (among Independents) in a regression with age, gender, and education as controls also produced a significant difference, r = -.12, β = -.11, p < .001 (and with ethnicity and income as additional controls in the smaller sample, r = -.09, β = -.08, p < .001).
CRT & Conservatism 17 .16, p < .001; and the correlation between social conservatism and CRT performance becomes more strongly and significantly negative, β = -.26, p < .001.
To illustrate the underlying source of these relationships, we computed a novel analyses of CRT differences as a function of political ideology on social and economic issues. For this, we created four groups of interest (representing 81.5% of the sample): 1) Classic liberals who identify as 'somewhat' or 'strongly' liberal for both social and economic issues (N = 4020), 2)
Classic conservatives who identify as 'somewhat' or 'strongly' conservatives for both social and of the American population identified as such; Jones, 2012) . This analysis also excludes difficult-to-classify individuals who selected moderate on one but not both types of issues (17% of the sample).
Following the same analysis plan as above, there was significant variability in CRT scores across the four key political categories, F(4, 9852) = 160.44, MSE = .08, p < .001, ƞ 2 = .05. As evident from Figure 6 , consistent moderates scored the lowest and libertarians scored the highest. 8 In parallel with the overall voting behavior and party affiliation analyses presented above, liberals scored higher than conservatives. A Tukeys HSD test revealed that all four groups were significantly different from each other, p's < .001.
Figure 6. Mean CRT accuracy (0-1) as a function of ideological category. Consistent moderate (N = 2154) = Individuals who identified as moderate on both social and fiscal issues. Classic conservatives (N = 2457) = Individuals who identify as 'somewhat' or 'strongly' conservatives for both social and economic issues. Classic liberals (N = 4020) = Individuals who identify as 'somewhat' or 'strongly' liberal for both social and economic issues. Libertarians (N = 1221) identify as (somewhat/strongly) liberal on social issues but (somewhat/strongly) conservative on economic issues. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
In addition to these results on the directional relationship between CRT and political ideology, we also consider the correlation between CRT and ideological extremity. This investigation is motivated in part by previous work showing that individuals who are more analytic tend to be more politically polarized on specific issues (e.g, climate change risk; Kahan et al., 2012) -although it should be noted that this line of work does not make clear predictions regarding the relationship between CRT and political extremity since the theory typically takes one's ideology as a given and then stipulates that analytic thinking is used to justify that ideology. As can be seen in Figure 6 , we find that politically engaged individuals (be they liberal or conservative) are more analytic than political moderates. To gain further insight into political extremity, we recoded the social and economic conservatism measures to reflect extremity of position: i.e., those who indicated being "strongly" conservative/liberal were given a 2, those who indicated being "somewhat" conservative/liberal were given a 1, and those who indicated being "moderate" were given a 0. Using this measure, CRT performance was modestly positively correlated with extremity for both social issues, r(12042) = .14, p < .001, and economic issues, r(12042) = .08, p < .001. However, as is evident from Interaction between behavior and ideology. Finally, as a robustness check on the interaction between party affiliation and voting behavior, we completed a parallel analysis to that reported above, but using the four political ideology categories in Figure 6 instead of political party. This revealed a significant interaction between political ideology and voting behavior (Figure 8) 
Figure 8. Mean CRT accuracy (0-1) as a function of the interaction between voting behavior and ideological category. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
General Discussion
In a sample of 15,001 participants gathered in the year following the 2016 US Presidential Election, we found strong evidence that reliance on intuition is correlated with political affiliation, ideology, and behavior. The pattern of results paints a complex picture which goes beyond the common claim that conservatives are more intuitive and less analytic than liberals.
The largest differences in performance on the CRT emerged when investigating the interaction between political opinions and political behavior. Most notably, Trump voters were less analytic overall -and this was particularly true for Democrats who voted for Trump. Although this only represented a small minority (3.8% of Democrats voted for Trump in our sample), these individuals scored substantially lower than the remainder of the sample (see Figure 5 ). Among Republicans, there was no difference between Clinton and Trump voters, but those who voted for a 3 rd -party candidate were the most analytic. As a consequence, although liberals tended to be more analytic than conservatives overall (see Figure 6 ), Republicans who voted for a 3 rd -party candidate scored 20% higher than Democrats who voted for Trump (d = .71;  this was the largest difference in the sample based on party affiliation, see Figure 3 ).
Furthermore, individuals who did not vote and/or who are politically "moderate" tended to be particularly intuitive whereas those who hold less mainstream positions -either by identifying as libertarian or voting for a 3 rd -party candidate -tended to be particularly analytic.
Theoretical implications
Liberalism vs Conservatism. The present results are consistent with dominant accounts of political cognition -at least as they pertain to the role of analytic thinking in the formation and retention of political attitudes and behavior -but also demonstrate the limitations and incompleteness of these accounts. In particular, we do observe an overall negative correlation between the propensity to think analytically and conservative political ideology: CRT scores were (a) higher among individuals who voted for Clinton relative to those who voted for Trump, (b) higher among Democrats than Republicans (in contrast to Kahan, 2013) , and (c) negatively correlated with social (but not economic) conservatism. Moreover, with respect to social issues, "strong" liberals scored higher on the CRT than "somewhat" liberals suggesting a positive association between liberalism and analytic thinking even among liberals. These associations align with the predictions of accounts wherein conservatism arises from reliance on intuitive thinking (Eidelman et al., 2012; Jost, 2017; Talhelm et al., 2015) .
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However, we also observe various exceptions to the overall tendency of liberals to think more analytically than conservatives. For example, the highest CRT subgroup in our affiliationbased analyses were Republicans who voted for 3 rd party candidates, and in our ideology-based analyses were libertarians. Thus, it is clearly not the case that being conservative necessitates relying on intuitive thinking -the intuitive conservatism account is not the full story. Instead, we
propose that there are three additional ways in which analytic thinking may impact political attitudes and behavior: 1) Apathy vs Engagement, 2) Orthodoxy vs Heterodoxy, and 3)
Cognitive Match vs Mismatch with Candidate/Platform.
Apathy vs Engagement.
Individuals who did not vote (for any reason) scored lower on the CRT than people who voted. Moreover, individuals who identified consistently as politically moderate (i.e., they did not identify as liberal or conservative for either social or economic issues) scored lower than liberals, conservatives, and libertarians. Finally, although political extremity (in the context of social and economic political ideology) was positively correlated with CRT performance, this correlation was primarily driven by low CRT scores among political moderates. These results suggest that one way in which analytic thinking impacts political attitudes and behavior is that thinking analytically undermines political apathy (and facilitates interest and engagement in political issues). This observation resonates somewhat with the claim that highly analytic individuals are more politically polarized because they are better able to reason in a motivated way (Kahan, 2013; Kahan et al., 2017) . However, our results suggest that when it comes to overall ideology (as opposed to positions on specific issues), analytic thinking's role may largely be in overcoming political indifference, rather than facilitating extreme political partisanship (see also; Sidanius & Lau, 1989) . This observation is also consistent with recent research in which CRT performance was associated with the ability to CRT & Conservatism 27 discern between fake and real news regardless of whether the news headlines aligned with one's political ideology (Pennycook, Cheyne, Seli, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2012; Pennycook, Tranel, Warner, & Asp, 2018) , one possibility is that individuals who are more analytic are more likely to shift away from whatever political position they emerged with from childhood and adolescence (as has been shown for religious belief, Shenhav et al., 2012) . Given that being a 'Democrat' or 'Republican'
(or voting for a primary party candidate) is more often the default position (and eschewing these positions presumably relies on analytic thinking), those who hold an alternative stance (or vote in an alternative way) are on average more analytic. Nonetheless, it should be noted that we have no information in the present sample about familial or communal political ideology -rather, we are making inferences assuming a binary Democrat/Republican political default. Longitudinal studies that track changes in political attitudes over time are necessary to firmly evidence this account. (Ahmadian, Azarshahi, & Paulhus, 2017; Jordan & Pennebaker, 2017; Oliver & Rahn, 2016) . For example, using text analytic methods, Jordan and Pennebaker (2017) found that Trump uses language that is much more in-the-moment, informal, and narrative (as opposed to formal, logical, and analytical) relative to other Presidents and presidential candidates. Previous work has shown that persuasive appeals are more effective when they are constructed to correspond with the target's personality traits (Hirsh, Kang, & Bodenhausen, 2012; Matz, Kosinski, Nave, & Stillwell, 2017 ) -a finding that may extend to correspondence in cognitive style between political candidates and voters.
Cognitive Match vs
Trump may also have attracted intuitive thinkers (and repelled analytic thinkers) because of his specific policy proposals, many of which had a particularly intuitively or emotionally compelling appeal (as opposed to being built around detail and careful analysis). For example, his proposal to build a several-stories high physical wall along the Mexican border to reduce illegal immigration evokes much more intuitively compelling mental imagery than the border fence favored by homeland security experts (Nixon, 2017) . Similarly, his proposal of using tough trade policies to bring manufacturing jobs back to the United States in large numbers likely resonated more at an intuitive level than Clinton's proposal to retrain individuals formerly employed in manufacturing. Future work should examine these possibilities experimentally.
Limitations
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There are a number of limitations of the present work that should be made clear. First, our sample is from Mechanical Turk which is not representative of the broader US population.
Individuals self-selected into the studies (although none were advertised as being about analytic thinking or political ideology) and presumably are comfortable with online surveys (which may not be true for pockets of the general population). Furthermore, as our data indicate, conservatives are under-represented on Mechanical Turk, and it is possible that conservatives on Mechanical Turk differ from other conservatives in ways that could affect our results. Thus, although previous work has shown Mechanical Turk to be a reliable resource for research on political ideology (Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz, 2012; Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Clifford, Jewell, & Waggoner, 2015; Coppock, 2016; Krupnikov & Levine, 2014; Mullinix, Leeper, Druckman, & Freese, 2015) , the present results should be replicated using a nationally representative sample, and it should not be assumed that our results generalize to the nation as a whole. Relatedly, our results speak only to the various theories of political ideology in the American context. It is unclear how or if aspects of the present results generalize to other countries. Unfortunately, this is a limitation of the broad literature on CRT and political cognition (with one exception where a Turkish sample was used: Yilmaz & Saribay, 2016b) .
Although analytic thinking was measured using a 7-item behavioral (rather than selfreport) measure, we did not include a direct measure of just cognitive ability (e.g., numeracy) as a control. As such, the extent to which the propensity to think analytically (as opposed to the ability) is responsible for the present results is unclear. Indeed, it may be that cognitive ability is a strong predictor of political ideology (Hodson & Busseri, 2012; Onraet et al., 2015; Saribay & Yilmaz, 2017 A separate issue is that our participants were asked about voting behavior well after the US Presidential Election (for some, close to a year after). Although it is unlikely that one would forget who they voted for, it is possible that some individuals might misreport their voting decision as a result of events that occurred afterward (Stocké & Stark, 2007) or report that they voted when they actually did not (Anderson & Silver, 1986 ). In addition, one's performance on the CRT at the time that they completed the study may not be the same as it would have been on the day that they voted (although there is evidence that CRT performance is quite stable, including for time periods exceeding a year; Stagnaro, Pennycook, & Rand, 2018) .
The present research takes a correlational as opposed to an experimental approach. There is some (albeit limited) experimental evidence that analytic thinking is linked to liberalism. Yilmaz & Saribay (2017b) found that analytic thought training increased liberal-consistent responses to politicized news articles (see also Pennycook & Rand, 2017) , but had no effect on political opinions on specific issues or general political ideology (see Deppe et al., 2015; Yilmaz & Saribay, 2016 for additional failures to induce an experimental effect). Further experimental work is required to understand the potential interaction between analytic training, political behavior, and political ideology.
Finally, the present data set emerged from studies with a different focus (namely, fake news; (Pennycook, Cannon, & Rand, 2018; Pennycook & Rand, 2017a . As such, this should be considered an exploratory study -albeit with a large sample size and substantial statistical power. Given the constantly changing political landscape,
CRT & Conservatism 31 confirmatory research undertaken during future elections would help establish both the validity and generalizability of our results.
Conclusion
It has often been argued that liberals are more analytic and less intuitive than conservatives (Deppe, Gonzalez, & Neiman, 2015; Eidelman, Crandall, Goodman, & Blanchar, 2012; Haidt, 2012; Jost, 2017; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003; Talhelm et al., 2015) .
In a sample of 15,001 participants, we did find support for this claim. However, our results also provide evidence for three additional mechanisms by which analytic thinking may impact 
